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A History and Theory of Informed Consent 
by Thomas Beauchamp and Ruth Faden 
(New York: Oxford University Press), 1986. xv + 392 pp. $29.95, Hardback. 
Beauchamp and Faden have provided a much-needed study of the history in America of 
the development and theory of informed consent, and this is a book that is well worth 
reading. It provided much valuable information about the development of informed 
consent, and it tries to account for it in contemporary legal and ethical theory. The authors 
argue that informed consent is relatively new in medical history, only developing 
significantly after the atrocities of World War II. They note that it developed as a device to 
protect patients from physicians and researchers who sought to manipulate patients for 
research or experimental reasons without providing any benefit to the patients. Since then 
it has developed to encompass those who participate in psychological experimentation as 
well. 
The book first illustrates the moral foundations of informed consent, and the authors 
ground informed consent on the moral principles of autonomy, beneficence and justice. 
The legal principles of liability, full disclosure and causation are seen as the legal 
foundations of informed consent. They note that the legal doctrine of informed consent not 
only requires that informed consent be obtained, but that information be disclosed. It is 
interesting that this positive duty is incumbent on physicians, for many argue that the law 
cannot compel physicians to take any positive actions. In light of this claim, if the law can 
compel physicians to undertake positive actions such as providing information, it would 
seem that it could also compel them to provide routine, customary care and routine patient 
maintenance. 
Beauchamp and Faden then provide a history of the doctrine of informed consent, and 
this section appears somewhat disappointing because it appears to be historically and 
ethnocentrically limited. There is virtually no mention of the development of this doctrine 
in antiquity, the middle ages and the early modern period . The authors did little 
investigation of the thought of medieval or early modern moralists, and one wonders if this 
was done because it was feared that it would compromise their claims that informed 
consent should promote pure contentless autonomy in decision-making. 
The sections describing the emergence of informed consent in America are helpful, but 
they seem to be rather narrow in scope. The doctrine of informed consent has developed in 
other countries where there are other perspectives on it and yet nJ hing was mentioned of 
those developments. The chapter discussing the evolution of the U.S. federal policies on 
informend consent doctrine suggests that this doctrine developed primarily to promote the 
autonomy of the patient, while in fact it evolved to prevent individuals from suffering 
psychological or physical harm as a result of research or experimentation. 
The authors describe the development of the requirement for informed consent in 
psychological research, and much information is given regarding contemporary 
controversies about the ability of individuals to give informed consent is provided. And the 
controversy between ethicists, psychiatrists and researchers over the ability of patients to 
give informed consent is concisely presented, well-explained and insightfully criticized. 
The most interesting section of this work is that dealing with the theory of informed 
consent. Beauchamp and Faden develop a rather complete and well-developed theory of 
human action, and they analyze closely the conditions required for informed consent. They 
suggest that informed consent in senseI as an autonomous authorization is not always and 
everywhere possible, but informed consent in sense2 as effective consent is possible in most 
circumstances. They argue that informed consent is possible when there is "substantial 
understanding" of the relevant material , and this is a reasonable claim. 
They hold that disclosure requirements should demand that health care professionals 
reveal to patients the benefits which accrue to a treatment, the expected risks, the optional 
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treatments available and the freedom of the patient to reject the treatment. They admit that 
it is sometimes difficult to properly communicate with the patient, but they claim that the 
best way of assuring that the pertinent information has been received is by confirming that 
it has been communicated to the patient. 
They discuss the problem of manipulation, coercion and persuasion of patients. 
Manipulation occurs when physicians only provide patients with certain forms of 
information, but withhold other forms of information so that the patient can only make 
one decision. This is generally considered to be objectionable, but in circumstances where 
there is sound reason to believe that the patient will make an immoral choice, the 
withholding of information which would justify such a choice would not seem to be 
immoral. This is pejoratively called "paternalism", but it is not clear how this differs from 
responsible professional use of information to protect a patient from immoral and harmful 
choices. 
The authors strongly object to coercion of patients. They seem to define coercion as 
forcing a patient by means of a threat to consent to a procedure that is in itself immoral. In 
contrast to coercion, manipUlation would seem to be the use, not of force or threat, but 
information, to bring the patient to a morally good decision. Persuasion, on the other hand, 
would seem to be the use of arguments or reasons to bring the patient to consent to a 
morally good action. It would seem that physicians should be morally free to try to 
persuade patients to consent to morally good decisions and to employ medical information 
to prevent a patient from making an unethical choice. These distinctions are not fully seen 
by the authors, and they voice, without adequate justification, objections to all of them. 
The authors suggest that informed consent exists to promote the requirements of justice, 
autonomy and beneficence. Yet when their theory is closely analyzed, it becomes clear that 
they see this doctrine exists primarily to promote the pure contentless autonomy of the 
patient. This is made evident for they do not discuss at any length the conditions under 
which an informed and competent consent can be overridden and treatment applied. The 
authors provide almost no discussion of the role that informed consent plays in making 
morally good health care choices possible. If concentration camp patients consented to 
their torture and malicious experimentation, that would not make those actions morally 
acceptable and good. Informed consent is in the service of morally good choices, and not 
merely in the service of the formal and contentless autonomy of the patient. 
We must be careful that we do not lose this perspective, for many who are promoting 
euthanasia by ommission of morally required care and treatment are arguing that the 
wishes of the patient, irrespective of their content, must be given full authority. Medical 
decisions made by patients with full and complete consent and info~mation can still be 
immoral, and there is a moral obligation incumbent on the physician to do what is possible 
to protect the patient from those decisions. 
It is unfortunate that the authors do not note how respect for the requirements of 
informed consent promotes medical practice. The patient-physician relationship should 
not be one that is dominated by either the physician or the patient, but should be a 
covenantal relationship between the two. In this relationship, the patient should strive to 
promote not just his or her own health, but also the development of medical practice and 
the fulfillment of the objectives of healing. This would mean that the patient must not stand 
in the way of the health care professional who is seeking to fulfill his or her ordinary, 
common and routine healing or nursing responsibilities. On the other hand, the physician is 
to respect the right of the patient to refuse any and all procedures that are purely 
experimental or not of any clinical benefit. Even further, the patient is to be free to refuse 
any medical treatment that is judged to be too physically painful, clinically useless or so 
burdensome financially that relevant ordinary financial obligations could not be met. The 
requirements of fully informed consent protect patients from unjust harm, but they also 
protect health care providers who attempt to be fully responsible healing professionals. 
What is needed at the present time are laws to protect physicians who attempt to provide 
emergency care or aspects of routine patient maintenance. 
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Twenty years ago, the popular model of the physician was that of Dr. Kildare, who 
boldly rushed in to do everything possible to save the last ounce of life. Now the popular 
image is that of a patient boldly fending off medical treatments which are unwanted, for 
whatever idiosyncratic reason the patient might have. It is time to find a median between 
these two extremes and recognize that both the patient and physician must be involved in 
these decisions, which are the most important in any patient's life. What is needed now is a 
legal and moral theory of informed consent which protects both the rights of patients to 
accept and refuse treatment and the right of health care professionals to provide it in accord 
with their professional responsibilities. Unfortunately, while Beauchamp and Faden 
provide much useful information about informed consent, they have not been able to 
provide a foundat ion for the sort of theory of informed consent that can achieve this 
objective. 
- Rev. Robert Barry, O.P., Ph.D. 
Assistant Professor of Religious Studies 
University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana 
Ethical Issues in Family Medicine 
by Ronald J. Christie and C. Barry Hoffmaster 
Oxford University Press. New York. 1986. 190 pp. 
Ethical Issues in Family Medicine was a difficult book to review. It is an important book 
because it attempts to deal with ethical issues in family practice. I am sympathetic to many 
of the ideas which emphasize the importance of family practice and the importance of 
understanding the need for a comprehensive knowledge of each patient, including that 
patient's relationship to the family unit and its concern, particularly about the individual as 
a person with a major emphasis on emotional factors . 
This provocative presentation of a unique theory on ethics in family practice by Christie 
(a family practitioner now deceased) and Hoffmaster (a member of the philosophy 
department) apparently rose out of their work together in the family practice program at 
Western Ontario University in London, Canada. The volume is provocative, in part, 
because it is unconventional. They find themselves dealing with the current dilemma of 
establishing a balance between patient autonomy and professional paternalism. They 
appropriately reject both as absolutes and attempt to arrive at some middle ground. Their 
answer seems to be to remove moral dilemmas from the area of decision-making 
(appropriate to a consideration of both autonomy and paternalism) and shift it into a moral 
grounds in which the family physician becomes virtually the moral guardian of both the 
individual and the family unit. They appropriately point out that the idea of total 
autonomy in the medical model is a fallacy because, even as a physician informs a patient 
about his condition, he is necessarily being formative and also conveying almost certainly 
some type of emotional support. A good physician, as physician, should be doing both. 
In the book, the authors give a series of almost too brief clinical vignettes on various 
topics. They then list the various options for each case report and then begin their ethical 
discussion. The methodology is appropriate and sometimes helpful but it is, at other times, 
May, 1987 87 
